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The Antidumping Act:
Proposals for Change
NOEL HEMMENDINGER
THE LONG VIEW
The Antidumping Act1 is in great trouble. Most of its
troubles flow from a basic misconception about the role of an anti-
dumping proceeding. A dumping case is sometimes looked on as
analogous to private party litigation in which domestic producers seek
to vindicate "rights" being injured by foreign exporters. In another
view, it is sometimes regarded as analogous to a criminal proceeding
in which the United States condemns and punishes certain methods
of foreign price competition as "unfair." In my view, it is preferable to
look at an antidumping proceeding as a method of resolving a conflict
in the execution of the economic foreign policy of the United States.
It is not feasible to attempt to characterize most methods of price
competition as "fair" or "unfair," depending on the price charged in
the home market. While egregious sales below home market prices
are readily apparent, in many cases it is not known to anyone, in-
cluding the foreign producer itself, whether sales are at less than fair
value (hereinafter LTFV) under the American law until an exhaus-
tive investigation has taken place. Even then, the decision is fre-
quently arbitrary and capricious, because it depends so much upon
the skill and pertinacity with which the data are presented on both
sides and with which they are evaluated by the Customs Service and
the Treasury Department.
The Antidumping Act tends to discourage a large segment of nor-
mal, rational business behavior. Discrimination in pricing among
different markets is a norm of business practice; a major entrepre-
neur who does not enjoy monopoly power in all its markets cannot
avoid it. Low pricing violates the laws governing unfair competition
Noel Hemmendinger is a member of the District of Columbia Bar and a
senior partner in the law firm of Arter, Hadden and Hemmendinger, Wash-
ington, D.C. The author's firm represents a number of foreign exporters and
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only if it is predatory-designed to drive competitors out of business
with a view to, and the capability of, monopolizing the market. 2 Not
all unfair prices, as defined in antidumping laws, constitute unfair
competition. Predatory intent cannot be inferred from pricing below
the prices in the home market, but only from prices at less than
marginal variable cost.
The difference between fair and unfair is also irrelevant to the
welfare of the importing country. Again excepting predatory dump-
ing, the effect on the economy of the importing country is the same
whether the home market of the imported product is above or below
the import price. When objection is taken to the effects of imports in
our market, we should consider what those effects have been, and
whether they are good or bad; only secondarily, if at all, should we
consider the circumstances abroad that generated the imports.
The view that an antidumping case is an act of economic policy
suggests that it may often not be in the country's best interests to
proceed with the investigation. Simply beginning an antidumping
investigation may have such a deterrent impact on importers that
imports vital to the United States economy are dried up. Treasury
already recognizes that the prosecution of an antidumping investiga-
tion may be undesirable. In 1976 the Secretary discontinued the
massive automobile cases on unprecedented grounds; basically, he
felt that it did not serve the United States' best interests to proceed. 3
Similarly, Treasury devised the Trigger Price Mechanism (here-
inafter TPM) to avoid having to carry through a multiplicity of inves-
tigations of steel imports. 4 Not only are the formal investigations
complex and time-consuming, more importantly, rigorous enforce-
ment of the Act would have virtually stopped steel imports, to the
detriment of the United States economy.
To understand the deterrent effect of a dumping complaint it is
necessary to understand the uncertainties and risks faced by the im-
porter. The uncertainty may last for thirteen months (sixteen
months, if Treasury extends the investigation in a complex case),A
After a determination of LTFV sales has been made, appraisement is
withheld on the imports in question and the importer must post bond
equal to the entire value of the imported goods. 6 This can quickly
become very expensive, and can very quickly shut off imports. But
even before the final LTFV determination, the mere filing of a dump-
ing complaint inhibits imports.
There may be cases in which importers have continued an injuri-
ous dumping trade up until the last moment before suspension of
appraisement, and even increased shipments to beat a deadline.
However, a more common consequence is that exporters try only to
complete outstanding contracts and immediately become cautious in
making new contracts. They do not want to be tagged as dumpers,
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and they want to create the best possible image to encourage either
discontinuance by Treasury or a no-injury finding by the ITC.
Another common response by the dumper is to raise prices to a level
safe from charges of dumping. Either way, simply beginning a
dumping investigation has a chilling effect on competitive sales.
This chilling effect has on occasion been strong enough to actually
risk harm to the United States economy, and to require in the na-
tional interest that steps be taken to discourage or discontinue dump-
ing investigations.
For these reasons, proceedings under the Act should not be re-
garded as simple law enforcement, but rather as involving a complex
exercise in administrative discretion. To treat them as law enforce-
ment is part of a broad trend in the United States toward dealing
with almost every problem through legal proceedings in which there
are rights, remedies, hearings, discovery, appeals, and all the other
paraphernalia of the modern legal process. The antidumping pro-
ceeding has become a form of litigation, and the more it acquires the
paraphernalia of litigation, the more it becomes unsuitable to the
problem. In this respect, it is not entirely different from the attempt
to regulate other types of trade through massive suits under the anti-
trust laws.
Treasury's bureaucratic response has changed from an administra-
tive proceeding virtually run out of the pocket of a Deputy Assistant
Secretary and frequently discontinued upon assurances that the low
pricing would cease, to an administrative proceeding with confiden-
tial and nonconfidential records, formal disclosures, hearings, and
appeals. Originally, it was possible to represent an entire foreign
industry for several months of a lawyer's time, with an equivalent
expenditure on the complainant's side. Today, a modest antidumping
proceeding involving a number of foreign companies will usually in-
clude a law firm for each company and repeated submissions repre-
senting years of lawyers' time, just for the Treasury proceedings.
Like some other forms of litigation, the antidumping proceeding is a
juggernaut that cannot be turned off. It also consumes vast amounts
of time for the government staffs involved.
Despite the adversary character of the modern antidumping case, it
remains fundamentally an administrative investigation involving the
collection and evaluation of economic data, first by the Treasury De-
partment and second by the ITC. If the proceedings are to be manage-
able, it is necessary to place limits on the extent to which the evidence
and the argument can be strung out, to place limits on the elaboration
of rules, both substantive and procedural, and to accept with as good
grace as possible the fact that whether they come quickly or at great
length, the results will reflect fallible human judgments. Most impor-
tantly, it is necessary to incorporate into the administration of the law
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considerations of the public interest, which the statute does not pre-
sently recognize, extending beyond the question whether a particular
American industry is injured by the importations at the margins in
question. When major industries are involved, it will frequently be
true that the best way of dealing with the problem is a negotiation
with the foreign countries most concerned. This is, in effect, what has
been done in the case of steel, although the TPM has a somewhat
unilateral flavor.
Because an antidumping proceeding involves the exercise of public
power to promote the country's economic welfare, the appropriate
investigation should be much broader than the narrow questions of
LTFV sales and injury to domestic producers. As noted above, the
proper line of investigation is to consider all of the effects of the
imports, and whether those effects are good or bad. Such an exami-
nation would be a two-part inquiry. First, are imports indeed threat-
ening the viability of a domestic industry. Second, if there is such
injury, what measures, if any, should be taken to protect the indus-
try, taking into account all circumstances of the trade and all ele-
ments of the national interest? By coincidence, we already have on
the books a law requiring exactly that inquiry-section 201 of the
1974 Act, familiarly known as the escape clause. 7
It is curious that recent pronouncements on foreign economic pol-
icy have characterized invocation of the escape clause as contrary to
free trade principles, while companies and industries complaining of
import competition have been exhorted to invoke laws that are actu-
ally more protectionist, such as the Antidumping Act, the counter-
vailing duty law and other laws against unfair competition.8 This is
in spite of the fact that under the escape clause the President would
have the authority to weigh all the interests concerned and to use
with flexibility all of the conceivable instruments of control; con-
versely, the only antidumping remedy is the assessment of special
duties to offset the claimed unfairness, and neither the President nor
the Secretary of the Treasury has any final authority to take into
account other elements of the national interest.9
There is a reason for such apparent irrationality. If it is up to the
President to decide whether imports are to be restricted, and there-
fore also to decide whether any particular domestic industry shall be
protected, an onerous political burden is placed on the President
from which he must be shielded. This shield, however, cannot be
complete; if the consequences of the antidumping remedies are un-
acceptable, the President may still find it necessary to intervene, as
he did through the TPM for the steel industry.'0
The escape clause already fulfills all of the sound purposes of an
antidumping act, without the overly protectionist consequences of
the Antidumping Act. The United States would save itself many
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headaches, both foreign and domestic, and would achieve more sen-
sible results, if it were to repeal the Antidumping Act and look chiefly
to other avenues for dealing with the problems raised by imports at
prices the domestic industry finds oppressive.
THE NEAR VIEW
It is out of the question that Congress will repeal the Antidumping
Act, or even revise it along lines suggested here, in the foreseeable
future. It is therefore necessary to consider measures that have some
chance of success in the medium and short term.
A Single Form of Proceeding
The most interesting of these is an idea that seems to have taken
hold in a number of different places-the adoption of a single form of
proceeding to obtain relief from imports."' Such a single proceeding
would relieve the petitioners of the risk and burden of selecting one
or more types of proceedings. Under present law, it can be very diffi-
cult to determine what statutory remedy should be sought. While
there is no theoretical bar to seeking relief through all channels at
once, this is inordinately expensive and is likely to create resistance
on the part of the triers of fact and lead to justified importer com-
plaints of harassment.
After application to the ITC, the Commission would conduct a pre-
liminary investigation. If warranted, it would request a foreign in-
vestigation conducted by Treasury. The Commission would report its
findings on the effect of imports on the domestic industry to the
President, and, if necessary, would make recommendations about
relief, which could encompass all of the options now available under
a number of existing laws. Although it would be possible to draft a
statute that would preserve all of the standards and remedies of ex-
isting laws, it would make more sense to modify them into a more
consistent pattern. The only substantive change that this limited pro-
posal would effect would be to give the President the last word in all
cases, including antidumping and countervailing duties cases. Con-
gress would probably also insist on an override provision.
Settlement of Dumping Cases
The resolution of dumping cases by settlement should be encouraged
at all stages of the proceeding. If a dumping dispute is seen as a
problem in the economic foreign policy of the United States, then we
should be receptive to resolution by negotiation with the interested
foreign parties (including the foreign government, if it chooses).
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Treasury went too far some years ago when it tightened the rules
with respect to discontinuances. 12 A case need not proceed to a
dumping finding, with the consequent administrative burdens on
both the Customs Service and the firms, to discourage excessively
low prices. Normally companies charged with dumping are quite
willing to reconsider their prices. The moment Treasury has word
that a dumping complaint is being filed, it should notify the foreign
government concerned. Treasury should seek agreement on the part
of the foreign industry concerned (with or without the participation
of its government) that dumping will not take place. This procedure
should be analogous to a consent order in judicial and Federal Trade
Commission cases-without admitting any violation, the business
concerned would agree that the acts complained of would not take
place in the future.
Safeguards are needed to prevent a settlement procedure from be-
coming simply a device for private anticompetitive agreements.
Complaining parties must be given a reasonable voice in any such
procedure, but they should not be given a veto. The antitrust problem
of private contacts is a real one, but it may not be as anticompetitive
as the drying up of foreign competition that so often accompanies the
mere institution of an antidumping investigation. The present atti-
tude in these matters by the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice appears to be that contact between the respective private
parties must be sedulously avoided. This attitude is excessively cau-
tious. What should be enforced fully is the requirement that any ar-
rangements be fully approved by the appropriate United States gov-
ernment authorities.
Specific Changes in the Law and Practice
There has been much criticism in the Congress recently suggesting
that the administration of the Act has been ineffective and that both
the law itself and its administration need to be tightened. Far from be-
ing an ineffective instrument for protecting American producers un-
fairly injured by iinports, the Act is too effective, and involves at least
four specific forms of overkill that should be eliminated from the law.
Collection of Provisional Duties
After dumping findings have been made, the Treasury Department
and Customs Service have sometimes been unable to assess the
dumping duties. This was most notable in the television cases. 13 To
make collection easier and to provide a further deterrent to dumping,
a proposal has been seriously advanced that provisional dumping
duties be fixed and collected at a preliminary phase of the investiga-
tion, based on margins found in the LTFV phase, rather than after
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final determination. 14 In my opinion this proposal misses the real
problems-the inherent complexity of the determination of dumping
duties, insufficient personnel assigned to the task, and consequent
breakdown of the administrative process. If the post-dumping find-
ing master lists are promptly prepared, this problem will disappear.
In any event, any estimated duties must in fairness take account of
the latest data submitted.
Comparison of Each Export Transaction with Average Home
Market Prices
Treasury regulations provide that unless there is a clear preponder-
ance of merchandise sold at the same price in the home market,
Treasury will compare prices of sales in the United States to an aver-
age price in the home market. 15 If one imagines a simple model in
which the average price in the home market for a given period is
exactly the same as the average price for export to the United States,
then one half of the sales for export must be at LTFV margins. Thus
it is common that, under the administration of the United States law,
dumping is found where, by any normal test, there is no dumping,
and the margins found exceed the true margins. This result is not
required by the statute, and it can easily be remedied by changing
the regulation.
After the investigation is complete and a finding of dumping has
been made, Treasury does not follow the averaging technique in as-
sessing dumping duties, but looks for a sale in the home market with
which to compare each entry into the United States. This practice
should be adapted to the fair value phase of the investigation. LTFV
sales should not be found if, in comparing the band of export sales
with the band of home market sales, there exists a home market sale
corresponding to the export sale under examination.
Difference in Circumstances of Sale
If it is established to the satisfaction of the secretary that the differ-
ence between the home market price and the export price is "wholly
or partly due to... differences in circumstances of sale ... then due
allowance should be made therefor. ' '16
The regulations put an unjustified limitation on the statute's un-
ambiguous words by providing that "differences in circumstances of
sale for which such allowances will be made are limited, in general,
to those circumstances which bear a direct relationship to the sales
which are under consideration.' 7
This small difference in language results in rejection of selling and
distribution costs that are clearly different and can readily be cal-
culated under accepted accounting principles. For example, where
a company has a domestic but no overseas distribution network,
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comparison to domestic costs and prices will lead to a finding of
LTFV sales where there really were none. 18
Section 205(b) Relating to Sales in the Home Market below Cost of
Production
In the 1974 Act, the Antidumping Act was amended to add section
205(b), 19 U.S.C. § 164(b).
Whenever the Secretary has reasonable grounds to believe or sus-
pect that sales in the home market of the country of exportation,
or, as appropriate, to countries other than the United States, have
been made at prices which represent less than the cost of produc-
ing the merchandise in question, he shall determine whether, in
fact, such sales were made at less than the cost of producing the
merchandise. If the Secretary determines that sales made at less
than cost of production (1) have been made over an extended pe-
riod of time and in substantial quantities, and (2) are not at prices
which permit recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of
time in the normal course of trade, such sales shall be disregarded
in the determination of foreign market value. Whenever sales are
disregarded by virtue of having been made at less than the cost of
production and the remaining sales, made at not less than cost of
production, are determined to be inadequate as a basis for the
determination of foreign market value the Secretary shall deter-
mine that no foreign market value exists and employ the con-
structed value of the merchandise in question.' 9
The corresponding regulations track the statute, but add the fol-
lowing sentence: "The cost of production ordinarily will be computed
on the basis of the actual costs of materials, labor and general ex-
penses, excluding profit, or, if necessary, on the basis of the best
evidence available. o20 In addition, Treasury has ruled that "an ex-
tended period of time" refers to a complete business cycle for the
industry in question.21
Section 205(b) raises two questions. Is the underlying premise that
sales below cost are ipso facto below fair value sound? Is the legisla-
tive technique by which the unfairness is countered sound?
The situation attacked by this section-where the producer sus-
tains sales in both home and export markets at prices that do not
cover full cost-has not been regarded as dumping in the classic
definition. 22 Section 205(b) is not only inconsistent with United
States international obligations based on the classic definition; it is
also undesirable in its own right, as removing from the scope of
international negotiation an area that is particularly suited for reso-
lution by international agreement.
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Technically, section 205(b) is inconsistent with United States obli-
gations as set forth in the GATT and in the International Dumping
Code. Article VI of the GATT provides that the comparison shall be
made with "the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for
the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting
country, or, in the absence of such domestic price, ...." by third
country sales or cost of production. 23
Article VI is unambiguous; if there are domestic sales, they must
be used. The Antidumping Code expression "if such sales do not
permit a proper comparison" 24 was intended to legitimize the prac-
tice of disregarding home market sales if they were too few to consti-
tute a comparable market; the phrase cannot be stretched to justify
disregarding a large number of domestic sales, made in the usual
course of trade, on the ground that they are below average costs. So
drastic a change cannot be read into a general expression of this sort.
Nor can it reasonably be argued that below-cost sales are ipso facto
not in the usual course of trade.
Aside from its inconsistency with United States international obli-
gations, the practice of treating sustained sales below full cost as
ipso facto below fair value is an undesirable extension of dumping
principles. The situation can arise only in the exceptional circum-
stance, such as afflicted the world steel industry in 1975 and 1976, in
which basic industries operate below capacity due to insufficient
world demand, had no way to operate profitably under conditions of
free competition until demand improved, and for reasons of national
policy could not be allowed to go out of business. Such a situation
calls for government-sponsored international regulation, which is
what happened in the steel sector. The United States adopted the
TPM and the EC adopted the Davignon Plan,25 amid extensive inter-
national consultations.
The TPM is, in theory, founded on Treasury's right to institute
proceedings under the Act.26 But the mechanism is so free an adapta-
tion of the United States law that it cannot be said to demonstrate
the validity of section 205(b). For instance, the TPM is based upon
the cost as calculated, with major judgmental variations, of the sup-
posedly most efficient producing country, Japan. It is a very broad
application of the Act to apply those costs to all sources exporting to
the United States, and the judgmental variations permit Treasury to
vary the trigger prices in response to various objectives, such as
allowing enough imports to serve the needs of the United States mar-
ket and dampening undue inflationary price effects.
It would have been simpler to provide in section 205(b) that ex-
ports to the United States at prices below full cost were ipso facto
below fair value without regard to whether or not they were below
home market or third country prices. Probably most of the legislators
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thought they were so providing. The actual drafting technique was to
provide that below-cost home market (or third country) sales are to
be disregarded, leaving constructed value or cost of production as the
basis of comparison, if remaining home market (third country) sales
are insufficient as a basis.
Constructed value is not always applied, because there are often
enough sales above cost in the home market to be a basis of compari-
son. This aggravates the unfair comparison of each export sale with
average home market sales discussed above. Section 205(b) requires
Treasury to disregard certain prices that are below cost in arriving at
the average home market price. The result is to introduce a double
bias. Each export to the United States is compared with a group of
sales necessarily above average in the home market.
This particular legislative technique was probably meant to help
reconcile section 205(b) with the GATT and the Antidumping Code,
discussed above. Had it frankly stated that below cost export sales
were below fair value, it would clearly have been inconsistent with
those international agreements.
For the reasons indicated, section 205(b) should be eliminated
from the Act, and problems of widespread overcapacity in basic in-
dustries should be dealt with through international negotiations. In
the absence of legislative modification, two changes in Treasury De-
partment practice are recommended.
First, Treasury should find the home market price for a particular
article in the usual way, using average or predominant price, and
then apply section 205(b) only if that price is below cost of produc-
tion; even then, Treasury should exclude only those sales that bring
the average price to below cost.
The effects of this section can also be mitigated by a high threshold
test. As a matter of statutory construction, the words "reasonable
grounds to believe or suspect" in section 205(b) could be construed in
pari passu with the expression "reason to believe or suspect" used in
section 201(b) of the Antidumping Act, which relates to the prelimi-
nary LTFV determination made after six months of investigation. The
latter finding is made upon a substantial evidentiary record, as Con-
gress was well aware when it enacted section 205(b). There is a strong
argument, therefore, that the Secretary should require a similarly
strong evidentiary record of below-cost sales before he investigates
the cost of production. Treasury's practice has been to decide to inves-
tigate the cost of production upon fairly thin allegations in the com-
plaint. A decision at that early point is not necessary. The Secretary
has authority to extend investigations to nine months, and this could
be the normal course where cost of production is investigated. Only
after a strong showing by complainants, thoroughly reviewed by Trea-
sury, or after the initial stages of an investigation have disclosed good
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reasons, should there be an investigation of cost of production. Trea-
sury should also make public the charges of sales below the cost of
production, and invite comments from interested parties before decid-
ing to initiate a cost of production investigation.
CONCLUSION
This article falls far short of doing justice to a subject that acquires
more and more complexity the more it is examined. 27 Because the
litigationlike procedures of the Antidumping Act are basically un-
suited to the resolution of the problems for economic foreign policy
presented by dumping, it should be either repealed or significantly
amended. The escape clause, section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act, is
much better suited for vindicating the national interest in cases in
which domestic producers suffer from foreign competition.
Since repeal is politically unlikely, a number of changes should be
made in either the practice or the law itself to streamline proceed-
ings, hasten resolution, and allow for more comprehensive consid-
eration of the national interest than is permissible under the current
law and practice.
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in which the International An-
tidumping Code was amended
to conform to the Subsidies
Code in relevant particulars.
However, the antidumping
amendments are mainly de-
signed to tighten procedures
under the Act in response to
congressional criticism of al-
leged laxity on the part of the
Treasury Department.
The changes intensify the
trends toward treating an anti-
dumping proceeding as private
litigation which are deplored in
this article.
The amendments shorten
time limits and impose limits
for the first time on the period
for assessing duties after a
dumping finding, require de-
posit of estimated duties after
the dumping finding, give the
complainants greater opportu-
nity to participate in the pro-
ceedings (notably by access to
confidential data under protec-
tive order), revise procedures
for "suspension" (previously
known as "discontinuance")
and provide many opportuni-
ties for appeals to the Custom
Court of both interlocutory and
final decisions of both the ad-
ministering authority (so-called
because the price-cost inves-
tigation may be transferred
from Treasury Department)
and the International Trade
Commission.
The partial overlapping of
the LTFV phase and the ITC
investigation will shorten pro-
ceedings, and the suspension
procedures will become appli-
cable regardless of dumping
margins, which is a desirable
step toward facilitating settle-
ment. However, the suspen-
sion proceedings are so over-
drafted and hemmed in by
restrictions that they are of
doubtful value unless further
amended. See statement of
Noel Hemmendinger dated
July 17, 1979, submitted to the
Senate Finance Committee in
connection with its July 10,
1979, hearing on S. 1376.
The new law will incorporate
the test of "material injury" in
lieu of just "injury," as long
provided in the GATT. How-
ever, the legislative history in-
dicates that no great change in
the actual picture is expected.
